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ABSTRACT 
 
CHRISTINA MOBLEY: "MAKE A COMMON CAUSE":  NEGOTIATION AND 
FAILURE TO COMPROMISE IN THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION, 1791 
(Under the direction of John Wood Sweet) 
 
 	   This	  work	  investigates	  the	  demands	  made	  in	  negotiations	  between	  white	  colonists,	  gens	  de	  couleurs,	  and	  insurgents	  in	  the	  opening	  months	  of	  the	  Haitian	  Revolution.	  	  It	  argues	  that,	  at	  least	  initially,	  demands	  for	  general	  emancipation	  were	  not	  made,	  but	  instead	  that	  insurgents	  sought	  the	  amelioration	  of	  working	  conditions	  on	  plantations	  and	  gens	  de	  couleur	  asked	  for	  political	  rights.	  	  It	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  on	  the	  ground	  interlocutors	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  aims	  and	  motivations	  of	  each	  group,	  and	  finds	  that	  military	  leaders	  of	  each	  group	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  important	  compromises.	  	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  pragmatism,	  contingency,	  and	  compromise	  of	  these	  early	  negotiations,	  the	  paper	  seeks	  to	  complicate	  the	  trajectory	  toward	  emancipation	  and	  republicanism	  emphasized	  in	  the	  historiography.	  These	  early	  negotiations	  allow	  for	  a	  deeper	  exploration	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  parties	  involved,	  one	  that	  emphasizes	  contingency	  and	  transformation.	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 I. Introduction 
In 1791, a slave insurrection began that, within fifteen years, would affect 
the political economy of Saint-Domingue, Europe, and the Americas.  In Saint-
Domingue, a localized revolt aimed at changing property relations in the North 
Province of Haiti turned into a broad scale attack on racial hierarchy and colonial 
authority.  In France, the Revolution escalated into a large-scale international war 
that pitted the French against British and Spanish invasions and domestically 
caused a reevaluation of racism and slavery within the empire.  In the Americas, 
the Haitian Revolution redistributed power, people and territory when Haitian 
refugees fled to neighboring countries and France sold Louisiana to America.  In 
1804, after a truly international conflict, Haiti became the second post-colonial 
independent nation in the Atlantic world and the first black republic, founded 
upon democratic notions of racial equality.  Indeed, these widespread 
ramifications make the Revolution's most dramatic consequences, emancipation 
and independence, seem inevitable.  However, in the autumn of 1791, nothing 
was certain; the actors and their objectives remained ill defined, fluid, and 
unclear. 
 Two sets of negotiations that took place in 1791, either of which could 
have changed the course of Haitian history.  The first was between insurgent 
leaders Jean François and Biassou and the Colonial Assembly, and the second 
between the gens de couleur military forces and Lieutenant Colonel Anne Louis 
  2 
de Tousard.1  The politics of work, labor, and political equality for the gens de 
couleur were all central issues in the negotiations, which proposed citizenship 
rights for gens de couleur, freedom for the leaders of the insurgents, three days a 
week free for slaves to work on their gardens, and the abolition of the whip and 
the cachot.  The limited demands made by each party lend insight into the 
malleable goals of those engaged in the fighting, especially important power 
brokers, who put forward a revolutionary political project whose failure ultimately 
led to the solidification of battle lines and the emergence of new objectives.  To 
understand the failure of these negotiations and the escalation of the conflict, I 
will explore the goals of key interlocutors, people whose positions of leadership 
allowed them to attempt to broker compromise.  These people were: Jean 
François and Biassou on behalf of the insurgents; Jean Baptist Marc and Cézar 
on behalf of the gens de couleur; and Lieutenant Colonel Anne Louis de Tousard 
on behalf of the colonial forces. 
 Examining these key interlocutors highlights three important aspects of the 
early development of the Haitian Revolution.  First, insurgent leaders at this time 
were demanding not an end to the slave system but rather serious changes in 
                                            
1 In this paper I will follow Laurent Dubois in using gens de couleurs, people of color, to 
include both free blacks and free people of mixed African and European ancestry.  
Haitian society was made up of a kaleidoscope of racial and ethnic identities, which 
functioned in different ways for different individuals.  In addition, class and gender also 
conditioned the experience of the Haitian Revolution, making simple binaries like white, 
black, or mulatto incomplete categories of analysis.  I have chosen to leave the racial 
terms used by my historical actors in the original French.  The reader will notice that 
Tousard differentiates between citoyens de couleur (citizens of color, ie mulattos) and 
nègres libres (free blacks) in speech but not in any material way in his negotiations.  M. 
Gros, on the contrary, does not make such distinctions in his narrative. 
 
  3 
the labor conditions on plantations.2  Second, some colonial whites, including 
military commanders Tousard and de Rouvray, were willing to accept some men 
of African descent as equals in order to keep others enslaved.  Last, the 
negotiations failed because tensions between these leaders and their followers -- 
the masses of gens de couleur, former slaves, and planters -- made compromise 
unsustainable. 
 It is possible to reconstruct both sets of 1791 negotiations through a 
variety of important and underused historical sources.  The first is the unexplored 
letterbook of Lieutenant Colonel Tousard (1749-1817), held by the Hagley 
Museum in Wilmington, Delaware. 3  Tousard, a royalist and a veteran of the 
American Revolution, played an important role in the early period of the 
Revolution as lieutenant colonel of the regiment of Cap Français.  After fighting to 
save Cap Français from the insurgents, Tousard led his troops southeast to Fort 
Dauphin, which was placed geographically and politically between the insurgents 
and the government in the capital.  This book of outgoing and some incoming 
correspondence covers the period from November 1791 to March 1792 and 
                                            
2 Several historians have commented upon this fact, however, few have explored Jean 
François and Biassou's demands at length.  Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial 
Slavery, 1776-1848 (London ;New York: Verso, 1988), Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing 
the Past : Power and the Production of History (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1995), 
Carolyn E. Fick, The Making of Haiti : The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), David Patrick Geggus, Haitian 
Revolutionary Studies, Blacks in the Diaspora (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 2002). 
 
3 The Tousard Letterbook is an extraordinary resource because it includes not only 
Tousard's letters to others but often their replies to him.  The Letterbook, which resides 
in the Hagley Museum in Wilmington, Delaware has not been used in any monograph 
length study of the Revolution that I am aware of, and gives an incredible perspective of 
the early period of the Revolution.  "Tousard Letterbook," in accession no. 892 
(Wilmington, De: Hagley Museum). 
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contains over three hundred letters.  It details his attempts to forge a partnership 
between gens de couleur and colonial whites, one that Tousard believed would 
save the slave system. The letters from insurgent leaders Jean François and 
Biassou to the Colonial Assembly provide a window into the insurgent camp, as 
does the account of M. Gros, a colonist taken prisoner by the insurgents who 
worked as their secretary during the negotiations.4  In addition, the proceedings 
of the Colonial Assembly are richly documented and extensively excerpted in 
Garran de Coulon's Rapport Sur Les Troubles De Saint-Domingue (1797-1799).5  
This source provides documents the intransigence of the Assembly and the 
frustration of the civil commissioners.  These sources allow for a deeper 
understanding of two sets of important debates surrounding precisely who would 
fight for whom and for what in the opening months of the revolution.  
 By looking at the pragmatism, contingency, and compromise of these 
early negotiations, I am seeking to complicate the trajectory toward emancipation 
                                            
4 M. Gros' account is the most influential account of the early days of the revolution, and 
according to Jeremy Popkin, the most widely cited.  Though we do not know much about 
the author, Gros' account, as a perspective inside the insurgent camp, has been 
invaluable to historians. In his narrative he particularly blames Governor Blanchelande 
and military commanders Marquis de Rouvray and Captain Pichon. In addition, Gros 
wrote his narrative and french and English.  The English version, which I use here, is 
roughly the same as the french except for an added section explaining the Revolution in 
general (which his french readers would already have been familiar with) and his political 
stance on the subject.  Mr Gros, An Historick Recital, of the Different Occurrences in the 
Camps of Grande-Reviere, Dondon, Sainte-Suzanne, and Others, from the 26th of 
October, 1791, to the 24th of December, of the Same Year. By Mr. Gros, Attorney 
Syndie [Sic] of Valiere, Taken Prisoner by Johnny. (Baltimore: Adams, Samuel), Jeremy 
D. Popkin, Facing Racial Revolution : Eyewitness Accounts of the Haitian Insurrection 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 105-08. 
 
5 Garran de Coulon's Rapport is all the more important because some of the 
documentation he used is no longer extant.  For example, the Moniteur de Saint-
Domingue for the relevant period, according to Jeremy Popkin (see previous note), is no 
longer available, having perished in a fire. 
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and republicanism emphasized in the historiography.  Twentieth century 
historians have agreed that the Revolution was a watershed moment in the 
history of democracy and anti-colonialism, in which the values of freedom, 
equality, and independence were understood as universal and absolute.6  
Further, they have rightly explored how class distinctions, the working class 
mentalité, and the transformation of republican ideology functioned in the 
Revolution.7  While the universalism of the Revolution is undoubtedly important, 
                                            
6 Any historian is indebted to those who have come before and paved the way for new 
work, and the Haitian Revolution has benefited from an uncommon amount of excellent 
scholarship: C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins : Toussaint L'ouverture and the San 
Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1989, 1938), David Patrick Geggus, 
Slavery, War, and Revolution : The British Occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793-1798 
(Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1982), Thomas Madiou, 
Histoire D'haïti (Port-au-Prince, Haiti: H. Deschamps, 1985), Thomas O. Ott, The Haitian 
Revolution, 1789-1804 (Knoxville] University of Tennessee Press [1973], 1973), Carolyn 
E. Fick, The Making of Haiti : The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1990), Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World : 
The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2004). 
 
7 Carolyn Fick in The Making of Haiti (1990) focuses on marronage as a form of 
continuous resistance throughout slavery culminating in the Revolution. “From 1791 on," 
she argues, "the development of the Saint Domingue revolution from below.” By looking 
at the Revolution through the lens of marronage Fick views Haiti’s independence as the 
result of the action of the masses.  Whereas previous authors, even those like James 
and Ott who argued for the agency of slaves, viewed the masses and unorganized, 
uneducated, and ineffectual, for Fick, the Revolution demonstrated "the self-
determination of those diverse and ordinary individuals of whom the masses were 
composed.  In their own way, they not only contributed to but were the very foundation of 
Haiti’s independence.”  Laurent Dubois in Avengers of the New World (2004) argues that 
Haitian revolutionaries transformed Republican ideology and rhetoric in order to push 
universal rights to include all men, black and white.  For this reason the Haitian 
Revolution contributed to understandings of democracy and citizenship in the Atlantic 
World, changing the political culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Dubois 
finds race, class, and the leadership of Toussaint Louverture incomplete lenses through 
which to view the Revolution. In Dubois’s work, it is not leaders such as Louverture that 
emerge as heroic, but rather, ideals of republicanism and democracy, created and driven 
by the slaves themselves, which inspire revolution, social transformation, and worldwide 
change.  The work of Dubois and Fick has been very influential to my own 
understanding of the Haitian Revolution.  I hope that through an in-depth exploration of 
  6 
looking closely at the beginning of the Revolution allows for a more complex 
reading of the motivations of those who took up arms, and reveals how the 
Revolution did not mean the same thing to all people at all times. 
 By examining the two sets of 1791 negotiations, I wish to explore both 
how a localized revolt escalated into a conflict for universalist principles, as well 
as the way in which issues of labor and work remained central and enduring.  By 
evaluating this early period we can understand the recurrent emphasis on quality 
of life, labor, and work that became channeled into republican ideology.  Jean 
François and Biassou's demands in 1791 clearly show that they were not 
explicitly fighting for the end of the institution of slavery, but rather for concrete 
changes in the labor relationship of the plantation system.  Likewise, the gens de 
couleur's short-lived alliance with Tousard’s forces demonstrates the uncertainty 
and inchoate nature of the early fighting.  These early negotiations allow for a 
deeper exploration of the goals of the parties involved, one that emphasizes 
contingency and transformation. 
                                                                                                                                  
the 1791 negotiations I may can build upon the already strong foundation created by 
their work. 
 
 II.  Tousard and the Gens de Couleur 
 The slave revolt that began on August 21st quickly developed into intense 
fighting across the North Province of Saint-Domingue.  By November, the 
colony's military leaders, gens de couleurs, and black insurgents were all 
interested in negotiating an end to the fighting.  Three months of bloodshed had 
made it was clear that colonists would not easily defeat the insurgency, which 
reportedly comprised 80,000 of the 170,000 slaves in the North Province.8  
Insurgent forces had spread throughout the plain, burning plantations, destroying 
equipment, and killing white colonists along the way.  Colonial forces in turn killed 
slaves, loyal and rebellious alike, indiscriminately, taking no prisoners.9  Women 
and children, black and white, fell victim to the warfare. One colonist described 
the scene: "The country is filled with dead bodies, which lie unburied.  The 
negroes have left the whites, with stakes &c. driven through them into the 
ground; and the white troops, who now take no prisoners, but kill everything 
black or yellow, leave the negroes dead upon the field."10  The war had become 
                                            
8 "St. Domingo Disturbances, 14 November 1791," Independent Chronicle and the 
Universal Advertiser 1791. 
 
9 Pamphile vicomte de Lacroix and Pierre Pluchon, La Révolution De Haïti, Relire (Paris: 
Karthala, 1995). 
 
10 "St. Domingo Disturbances," General Advertiser, 11 October 1791. 
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an "exterminating war" with the two sides at a deadly stalemate.11 Though a 
rumor existed that French ships would arrive shortly carrying troops, not all 
colonists were convinced that the troops would be effective when -- and if -- they 
arrived.  It was in this context that the military commanders fighting on the ground 
took it upon themselves to find a way to end the fighting, by subterfuge or 
negotiation.  
 Lieutenant Colonel Tousard was ideally situated to negotiate an end to the 
stalemate.  At Fort Dauphin he was literally at the center of both the fighting and 
the negotiations, positioned geographically between the insurgents and gens de 
couleur, who controlled the hills near the Spanish border, and the Colonial 
Assembly and Governor in Cap Français.  Tousard's position was well placed in 
the topography; the area was "the shape of almost an island,” bordered by the 
sea on one side and the Spanish border of Santo Domingo on another, forcing 
the insurgents to go through Tousard to reach the capital.12  Tousard was 
therefore poised to play an important role in ending the fighting -- through victory 
or compromise. 
 When Tousard first arrived at Fort Dauphin, he was arrogant, ambitious, 
and aggressive, convinced that he could quickly defeat the upstart rebel slaves.  
However, he was quickly disabused of notions of easy victory.  The day after he 
arrived, on November 17, Tousard wrote to Governor de Blancheland that his 
entire day had been employed with receiving compliments and expressions of joy 
                                            
11 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 116, 18. 
12 Lacroix and Pluchon, La Révolution De Haïti, 93. 
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from all of the local citizenry, and that he was confident he would quickly 
establish communication with the gens de couleur and rout the insurgents.  For 
this reason, Tousard was initially unwilling to facilitate dialogue with insurgent 
leaders Jean François and Biassou; he believed the colonists could win outright 
by forging an alliance with the gens de couleurs currently fighting with the 
insurgents.   
 Free people of color were necessary military allies, having served in the 
colony's slave-hunting constabulary, the maréchaussée.  The maréchaussée had 
been created in 1721 in order to hunt maroons and police the slave population.  
Following the refusal of white colonists to serve in the maréchausée, 
administrators allowed for free people of color to join, offering them positions as 
full time employees of the crown.13  It was, thereafter, free people of color who 
stood as the bulwark between white colonists and rebellious slaves, a fact that 
paved the way for demands of political equality and the rights of citizenship.14  
Service provided gens de couleur a salary and the opportunity for social mobility.  
However, a racist hierarchy governed the maréchausée with free people of color 
serving under white officers.  Socially and legally, gens de couleur were 
                                            
13 John D. Garrigus, Before Haiti : Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue, The 
Americas in the Early Modern Atlantic World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
100, 03-05. 
 
14 Julien Raimon, a prominent person of color, organized a political battle in the colony 
that eventually took him to Paris in 1789, where he demanded the National Assembly 
give rights to free people of color.  White planters fought vehemently against Raimond, 
arguing that white supremacy was necessary to preserve the slave system.  Ironically, 
this mindset would keep white planters from allying with the very military forces that 
might have restored the slave system in Saint Domingue in 1791.  Dubois, Avengers of 
the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 54-55, 64-65. 
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subjected to increasing discrimination in the years following the Seven Years 
War (1756-1763), such as limitations on the type of dress and profession, and 
the application of racial terms to gens de couleur in legal documents.15  During 
the 1780s, many free people of color began fighting for political equality, using 
the colony's dependence upon their military role in order to demand political 
rights.  During the insurgents’ attack of Cap Français, free people of color 
organized into forces and, by all accounts, fought valiantly to save the city.16  Yet, 
despite the importance of gens de couleur military forces, the Colonial Assembly, 
decided to table the question of political rights for free people of color until after 
the insurrection was defeated.17  Tousard's attempts to ally white forces with the 
gens de couleur, therefore, took place in the context of free people of color's 
demands for political inclusion and the insistence of white planters that white 
privilege was necessary to maintain slavery. 
                                            
15  Following the loss of Quebec, which France ceded to Britian at the end of the war,   
French North America experienced a "hemispheric reevaluation of creole identity."   
Racial terminology "mulatto" and "quadroon" came into usage in the legal sphere as well 
as laws mandating freed slaves continue to show respect for their former masters.  Free 
people of color could, however, own land, buy slaves, live in towns, receive and 
education, and practice most professions.  They could not become surgeons or notaries, 
nor could they wear certain fabrics or garments, or attend certain theatres.  Dominique 
Rogers has found no evidence of racial segregation being enforced in Saint Domingue.  
Her research found that though there were segregation laws in place, they were rarely 
enforced and some officials even supported the social integration of free people of color 
with white society. Dominique Rogers, Les Libres De Couleur Dans Les Capitales De 
Saint-Domingue:  Fortune, Mentalités Et Intégration À La Fin De L'ancien Régime (1776-
1789) (Unpublished Manuscript, 2005), Chapter 5.  Garrigus, Before Haiti : Race and 
Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue, 110, 63.  Dubois, Avengers of the New World : 
The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 61, 64. 
 
16 "St. Domingo Disturbances." 
 
17 Lacroix and Pluchon, La Révolution De Haïti, 127. 
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 Tousard and the commander of the colonial forces on the west of Cape 
Français, the Marquis de Rouvray, were willing to accept gens de couleurs as 
equals in order to preserve slavery.  The military commanders attempted to 
convince the Assembly that giving political rights to people of African ancestry 
was, in fact, the only way to preserve slavery in the colony.  The military 
commanders addressed the Colonial Assembly in early November, asserting that 
sheer numbers alone necessitated such an alliance.  The slave population in the 
colony outnumbered the white 500,000 to 40,000.18  "What is the white 
population compared to the multitude of rebel slaves?" de Rouvray asked, "Isn't 
this enemy enough, without continuing to provoke the freed-coloreds?"19  An 
alliance with the over 30,000 gens de couleur would not only provide more troops 
for the colonists, but would deny troops and supplies to the insurgents.   
 Tousard followed de Rouvray arguing the Colony must acquiesce to the 
gens de couleur's demands because of the dire military situation and the 
desperation of his troops. "For three months the war with the slaves wages" on, 
he said, and "in spite of our successes, we have been less advanced than the 
first day."  Tousard bemoaned the lack of troops. "The line of troops will be 
exhausted before they reach the enemy," making the only viable option retreat. 
                                            
18 Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, 5.  Population figures for Saint-Domingue 
come from Moreau de Saint-Méry's classic description of the colony and have been 
revised (lowered) slightly by David Geggus.  M. L. E. Moreau de Saint-Méry, Blanche ed 
Maurel, and Etienne ed Taillemite, Description Topographique, Physique, Civile, 
Politique Et Historique De La Partie Française De L'isle Saint Domingue, Bibliothéque 
D'histoire Coloniale ; Nouv. Sér (Paris, Société de l'histoire des colonies françaises, 
1958., 1958). 
 
19 Thomas Madiou, Histoire D'Haïti (Port-au-Prince, Haiti: H. Deschamps, 1985), 
Annexe, 478, quoted in Dubois, 118. 
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"It is thus a question," he said, "less of fighting [the insurgents] than of harassing 
them."  Tousard put forward that an alliance with gens de couleur was not only 
the best option, but also the only option.  "At present," he asked, "where is the 
army capable of fulfilling its goal?"   Where would the assembly find battle-
hardened cavalry capable of fighting without succumbing to the tropical diseases 
that would no doubt strike down French troops?  Allying with the gens de couleur 
troops was the only option.  "Why do you reject the help they offer," he asked, 
"and prefer to see them among the number of our enemies than to count them in 
the number of our defenders?"20     Tousard concluded by pointing out that 
the spirit of the French Revolution would surely cause the National Assembly to 
look upon the gens de couleur with sympathetic eyes and that they would most 
likely once again be granted political rights once the Assembly received news of 
the insurrection.21 Despite Tousard and de Rouvray's cogent arguments, the 
Colonial Assembly remained intransigent.  Nonetheless, Tousard and de 
Rouvray's insistence demonstrated that some colonial whites were willing to 
embrace some people of African ancestry in order to keep others enslaved.  
                                            
20Rouvray ["Qu'est la population blanche en comparaison de la multitude des esclaves 
révoltés?  N suffit-il pas de cet ennemi, sans provoquer encore les gens de couleur?"]  
Tousard [""Depuis trois mois, dit M. de Thouzard, la guerre dure avec les esclaves, et, 
malgré nos succès, nous sommes moins avancés que le premier jour.... A présent, je le 
demande, où est l'armée capable de remplir ce but?  Où trouver la cavalerie propre à ce 
genre de guerre?  Pourquoi rejetez-vous les secours qu'ils offrent, et préférez-vous les 
voir parmi nos ennemis, à les compter au nombre de nos défenseurs?"]  Thomas 
Madiou, Histoire D'haïti (Port-au-Prince, Haiti: H. Deschamps, 1985), Annexe, 478. 
21 Indeed, on May 15, 1791 the National Assembly had granted political rights to free 
people of color born to a free mother and father.  Following intense protest from the 
Colonial Assembly, in September the National Assembly revoked the May decree and 
instead decreed that the colony itself would have jurisdiction over matters of political 
rights within its borders.  Ultimately, Tousard's prediction proved correct and in April, 
1792, the National Assembly granted political rights to free people of color. 
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 The gens de couleur Tousard wished to partner with made up a significant 
portion of the insurgent officers who controlled the hills around Ouinaminthe, on 
the eastern edge of the province near the Spanish border.22.  At their helm was 
Jean-Baptiste Marc, a free black described as one who "ruled with the air of an 
army general" and who was reportedly well known in the area for thievery, 
controlled the forces at Ouinaminthe.23  Second in command was a recently freed 
black named Cézar. White colonists could not understand why gens de couleur 
would align themselves with the revolutionary slaves.  Governor Blancheland 
complained incredulously (and erroneously) to the Minister of the Marine that the 
gens de couleur of le Trou and Grand-Rivière who had joined the insurgent army 
did not even have "authority over [the insurgent slaves]; their leaders are all 
chosen from among the blacks, and not one from the gens de couleur."24  M 
Gros likewise observed that the gens de couleur were mistrusted by the formerly 
enslaved.  Nonetheless, whether Tousard, Blancheland, or Gros understood it or 
not, many gens de couleur did choose to side with the insurgents. 
 Shortly after his speech to the Assembly, Tousard took it upon himself to 
use his military position to negotiate with the gens de couleur.  On November 
18th, he wrote to the "Citizens of Color in the Dependence of the East" entreating 
                                            
22 The history of this event comes from a memoire of an inhabitant of Ouinaminthe found 
in the DXXV file of the Archives Nationale in Paris, France.  "Mémoire fait par un 
habitant d'Ouinaminte."  in Fick, The Making of Haiti : The Saint Domingue Revolution 
from Below, 111. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Blanchelande au Ministre de la Marine, le Cap, 29 Sept. 1791 quote in Ibid., 112.  Fick 
notes, however, that "the vast majority of the higher command posts in the Grand-
Rivière area in fact went to the free blacks.,"  304 n110. 
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them to leave the insurgents and join him.  Tousard began by expressing his 
surprise at the alliance between the gens de couleur and the insurgents.  "What 
did I learn upon my arrival at Fort Dauphin?" he began, "Citizens of Color 
reunited with the Brigands." Tousard described free people of color as 
proprietors, not slaves, and therefore economically allied with the white cause.  
He derided the gens de couleurs as "The proprietors become the instruments 
that serve the revolting slaves -- moaning in shame and in pain to have forgotten 
your ignored attachment and scorned the advice of the whites."  Tousard seemed 
to understand that, at the beginning of the fighting, when overwhelmed by 
insurgent forces, free people of color might have chosen to form an alliance with 
them.  However, with Tousard's forces now in the area, the very forces who had 
accepted gens de couleur troops in Le Cap, the free people of color should leave 
the insurgent camp and join with him.  "Why from the instant of my arrival did you 
not throw yourselves into my arms?" he asked,  
 "I would have protected and saved you from all of the bad that awaits you 
if you persist in this reunion with the enflamed brigands -- you know who 
saved the gens de couleur of le Cap...Come under my orders and make a 
common cause with your Fathers who desire to become your brothers: 
come aide me in destroying a horde of brigands..."25 
 
                                            
25 [A tous les citoyens de couleur de la Dépendance de L'Est, Qu'ai je appris a mon 
arrivé au Fort Dauphin?  Des citoyens de couleur réunis aux Brigands, des propriétaires 
devenus les instruments dont se servent des esclaves révoltes -- gémisses [sic] de 
honte et de douleur d'avoir oublié vos méconnu l'attachement & méprisé les conseils 
des blancs -- qu'il est votre dessein & que prétendez vous?  Pourquoi dès l'instant de 
mon arrivé d'est vous pas venu vous jeter dans mes bras je vous aurais protégé et 
sauvé de tous les maux que vous attendent si vous persiste dans réunion avec l’infâme 
brigand -- vous savez qui à sauvé les gens de couleur du Cap.... Venez sous mes 
ordres et faites cause commune avec vos Peres qui veulent bien devenir vos frères: 
venez m'aider à détruire une horde de brigands...c'est a côté du régiment du Cap qui je 
vous propose de combattre les ennemies..."] "Tousard Letterbook," 4-5. 
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Tousard does not breach the issue of political rights in his letter, but he does 
repeatedly refer to the gens de couleur as property owners and that their 
interests were therefore opposed to those of slaves.  "It is side by side with the 
regiment of le Cap that I propose you fight the enemies of your properties," he 
wrote.26  Tousard invoked le Cap in order to underscore his role supporting gens 
de couleur troops who had fought in the capital.  Tousard enjoined the gens de 
couleur to meet with him regarding a rapprochement.  With this first letter, 
Tousard had taken upon himself a course of action the Assembly would not 
sanction, but that his position as an intermediate power broke allowed him to 
undertake. 
 Tousard's strategic good will towards gens de couleur, however, did not 
extend to the slave insurgents themselves, who Tousard arrogantly expected to 
easily defeat.  Tousard's letter to Jean François and Biassou, written the same 
day as his letter to the gens de couleur, contrasted greatly with his praise of the 
gens de couleur to the Assembly. Tousard addressed his letter "To the chiefs of 
unhappy ones who for the price of the kindness of the whites carry fire and the 
flames in the homes of their benefactors and their fathers, it is to you who I 
address myself."  Tousard was writing not to negotiate, but to issue an ultimatum.  
"A solitary instant is given you," he cautioned: 
  My hand, accustomed to combating you and to destroying every trace of 
you, [offers you] not a pardon that you do not deserve, but to help you 
escape the punishment that you cannot escape, if one time I march 
against you -- I offer to grant you passage to New England... see the end 
                                            
26 ["C'est à côté de régiment du Cap que je vous propose de combattre les ennemies de 
vos propriétés...] Ibid., 4. 
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met by Boukman27 and see that which awaits you -- if my vengeance is 
forestalled, know that it will be a terrible vessel." 28 
 
Tousard's offer of safe passage to New England was a far cry from the demands 
Jean François and Biassou were making at the same moment of the Colonial 
Assembly.  Tousard's strong words to the insurgents demonstrate that his desire 
to ally with gens de couleur was not out of racial liberalism or any aversion to 
slavery, but was rather a utilitarian means through which to save the institution.  
 The leader of the gens de couleur forces, Jean-Baptiste Marc, took 
advantage of Tousard's entreaties by claiming that his followers were mistrustful 
in order to secure legal confirmation of the concessions that would be granted to 
the gens de couleur in exchange for an alliance.  Two days after his original 
letter, Tousard wrote to the "citizens of color" asking them to appoint deputies 
"provided with the full power to treat and compromise directly with me the means 
of reestablishing tranquility between them and the white citizens," as well as "the 
most convenient means of combating and exterminating the Brigands."29  
                                            
27 Boukman was one of the founders of the insurrection.  He was killed in battle in early 
November, 1791.  His death was mourned in insurgent camps. 
 
28 Translation my own, I have made minimal changes in order to modernize the 
punctuation and spelling for the ease of the reader.  ["Aux chefs des malheureux qui 
pour prix des bontés des blancs portent le feu et les flammes chez leur bienfaiteurs et 
leurs pères.  C'est à vous qui je m'adresse, ... un seul instant vous est encore accordé 
ma main accoutumé à vous combattre et à vous détruire vous traces, non un pardon 
vous ne le mérité pas, mais de vous aider à éviter le châtiment que ne peut vous 
manquer, si une fois je marche contre vous -- je vous offre de vous faire passer à la 
nouvelle Angleterre avec un sauf conduit... voyez la fin de Boukman et voyez celle qui 
vous attends -- si ma vengeance est retardé, songé qu'elle sera terrible un vaisseau..."] 
"Tousard Letterbook," 2-3. 
 
29 ["munis de leur plein pouvoir pour traiter et transiger directement avec moi des 
moyens de rétablir la tranquillité entre eux et les citoyens Blancs, et [illeg.] aux moyens 
les plus convenables de combattre et d'exterminer les Brigands."] Ibid., 11. 
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Tousard then met with deputies elected by the gens de couleur who, according to 
a letter he wrote to Blancheland, left him with every hope of establishing a 
partnership. The deputies carried with them a letter from Jean-Baptiste Marc to 
Tousard.  In the letter, Marc immediately positioned himself as repentant.  "It is in 
vain," he began, "that we come to testify to you the sorrow our situation has 
brought us."30  He continued that it was by "conduct and not their discourse" that 
the gens de couleur would prove their regret at having joined the insurgency.  In 
the "whirlwind" of the insurrection, Marc explained, they had been "in the sad 
position to be able to employ only prayers and threats to prevent of larger 
misfortune."31  With the arrival of Tousard in the area, he continued, "Finally the 
moment [had] arrived to avenge the white citizens our fathers and our 
benefactors."32  However, despite this good will, Marc wrote that he would need 
proof of Tousard's sincerity to convince the doubters among his troops.  There 
was enough "contrariety of spirit" among his ranks, those "who needed to be 
reassured" that it would be "necessary to give confidence to the mistrustful."  
Marc wrote that while they had nothing to ask, and only wanted to "throw 
themselves in [Tousard's] arms," still they required some form of proof, some 
agreement, with which to convince his mistrustful troops that they were not being 
                                            
30 ["C'est en vain que nous viendrions vous témoigner le chagrin ou nous à plongé notre 
situation"]  "Jean-Baptiste Marc à Tousard, 19 Novembre 1791,"Ibid., 19-20. 
 
31 ["une espèce de tourbillon ils se sont vu dans la triste position de ne pouvoir employer 
que les prières et le menace pour empêcher de plus grande malheur."] Ibid., 21. 
 
32 ["Enfin le moment est arrivé de venger les ... de MM les citoyens blancs nos pères et 
nos bienfaiteurs."] "Jean-Baptiste Marc à Tousard, 19 Novembre 1791,"Ibid. 
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lulled into a trap.33  Whether or not Marc was convinced of Tousard's good 
intentions, he skillfully manipulated the mistrust of his followers in order to gain a 
legal Concordat with Tousard, a method Jean François likewise employed, but 
without success, with the Colonial Assembly. 
 Marc's tactic was successful and several days later a generous Concordat 
was signed by the deputies and Tousard.  The Concordat "Authorized by the 
different sections of inhabitants of the Department to be bearer of an act, dressed 
with all their signatures, dated the 21st [of November], with the effect of 
cementing the inalterable union between them and the citoyens de couleur & 
nègres libres.... who from now are as brothers, [and of] being the best means of 
dissipated all of their anxiety, establishing an inalterable confidence and proving 
to all the prompt reestablishment..." of peaceful relations.34  The Concordat 
contained this preamble as well as eleven articles, clarifying the actions of each 
side.  The gens de couleur thereafter became part of the Army of the East, under 
the command of Tousard, keeping their own officers and leaders. Tousard was 
                                            
33 It is likely here that Jean-Baptiste Marc was referring to the Ogé affair.  Ogé was a 
free person of color who, in 1780s, travelled to the National Assembly in Paris with 
Julien Raimond seeking political rights for free people of color.  Ogé became 
disillusioned with the Assembly and returned to Saint-Domingue, were he mobilized an 
army of supporters, who numbered in the hundreds.  Troops from the capital quickly 
defeated Ogé, who fled to Santo Domingo but was extradited, tried and broken on the 
wheel along with another of his supporters, Jean-Baptiste Chavannes.  Dubois, 
Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 80,82,87-8. 
 
34 "[cémenter une union inaltérable entre eux et les citoyens de couleur & nègres libres à 
repondre a toute leur demande et a prendre avec de citoyens qu'ils regardens dés a 
présent comme leur freres les moyens le plus propres à dissiper toute leur inquietude, 
établir une confiance inalterable & a prouver à tous le plus prompt retablissement dans 
leurs foyers et dans leurs possessions d'une part.]" "Concordat entre les Citoyens de 
Couleur et Tousard, 23 Novembre 1791,""Tousard Letterbook," 26. 
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responsible for having informed the white citizens of the agreement.  The 
citoyens de couleur, "for their part [said] their reunion had no cause except the 
public good."35  Though the document did not (and could not) grant political 
rights, it did refer to the gens de couleurs as "brother" and equals, demonstrating 
just how far Tousard was willing to go to secure the alliance.   
 The document went on to stress the permanence and inalterability of the 
agreement. Perhaps this was in an effort to keep the Colonial Assembly from 
attempting to void the Concordat, which they would eventually do.  In order to 
avoid such nullification, the Concordat clarified its legal basis -- the Decree of the 
24th of September, the very proclamation Jean François and Biassou were 
simultaneously attempting to use in their own negotiations. When the civil 
commissioners, Mirbeck, Roume, Saint-Laurent, and Saint-Léger, had arrived 
from France in the middle of November, they were unaware of the Revolution 
taking place in the colony.  They brought with them neither official response nor 
troops to fight the insurgency, but instead a decree that would be central in the 
negotiations taking place.  The 24th of September Decree, proclaimed that while 
the King and the National Assembly retained control of all external matters 
relating to the colony, the "laws concerning the state of unfree persons and the 
political status of men of color and free blacks" would remain under the purview 
                                            
35 ["MM les députés des citoyens de couleur ont dit à leur tour que leur réunion n'avait 
eu pour cause que le bien public, car la réclamation qu'ils font des lois est une chose 
absolument indépendante de caprices des particuliers dont l'exécution appartient 
particulièrement au pouvoir exécutif..."] "Concordat entre les Citoyens de Couleur et 
Tousard, 23 Novembre 1791,"Ibid., 27. 
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of the colony.36  This repealed the earlier decree granting free people of color 
born to free parents political rights, and instead placed their fate into the hands of 
the Colonial Assembly.  The Decree also importantly offered amnesty to any free 
person who had committed "acts of Revolution."37 Thus, while the political status 
of gens de couleur remained squarely in the hands of the Colonial Assembly, the 
amnesty applied to all free people, and was beyond the Assembly's revocation. 
 The Concordat specifically stated that this amnesty was the basis of the 
agreement, and therefore was in accordance with metropolitan laws.  Article 
three stated:  "That the citoyens de couleur accept ... the decree of the General 
Assembly of September, that the amnesty which is accorded them will guarantee 
in all forms the integrity of the white citizens..."38 The Concordat itself then, 
because it was based upon a decree of amnesty from Paris, had to be respected 
by white colonists.   
 The Concordat provided for exceptions from amnesty, however, it did so in 
a way that empowered the gens de couleur to police their own forces. The next 
article stipulated that the "citoyens de couleur asked particularly to be authorized 
to except from this amnesty those who they knew to be carried away with 
                                            
36 Quoted in ———, Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 
125. 
 
37 Jean-Philippe Garran de Coulon, Rapport Sur Les Troubles De Saint-Domingue : Fait 
Au Nom De La Commission Des Colonies, Des Comitées De Salut Public, De 
Législation Et De Marine (A Paris : De l'Imprimerie nationale, an V-VII de la République 
[1797-1799]), 2: 301-02. 
 
38 ["Que les citoyens de couleur acceptant avec reconnaissance L'arrêtée ....de 
L'assemblée générale que l'amnistie qu'elle leur accord leur fera garanti dans toute 
forme intégrité par les citoyens Blancs..."] "Concordat entre les Citoyens de Couleur et 
Tousard, 23 Novembre 1791,""Tousard Letterbook," 28. 
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excesses and to be able to deliver them themselves to the vengeance and the 
severity of the law."39 By leaving the power to punish free people of color to the 
gens de couleur themselves, the Concordat deftly removed a possible avenue 
through which white colonists could attack the alliance.  In sum, the Concordat 
was extremely generous to the gens de couleur, showing both Tousard's 
desperation for the alliance, as well as the amount of bargaining power the gens 
de couleur had in the context of the insurrection's success. 
 Tousard carefully undertook measures to empower himself to create a 
Concordat.  Tousard justified his actions in letters to de Rouvray and 
Blancheland by stating that he has only acted in accordance with the law, and 
was acting in the best interests in the colony, and that the insurgency would soon 
be defeated. Tousard asserted that, while he hoped his superiors would agree 
with him, his actions were absolutely legal.  He further claimed that the local 
colonists supported his initiatives.  In truth, Tousard had secured their support by 
gathering together the white citizens of the town and surrounding plains and 
having them sign a document stating that they authorized him to negotiate on 
their behalf.  Two days before the Concordat was signed, Tousard addressed the 
townspeople.  He proclaimed that all white citizens "animated with the desire for 
the public good and the well-being of this Colony..." would wish to cement the 
union with the gens de couleur and would dissipate any anxiety or mistrust 
between the two groups.  He declared the alliance to be in accordance with the 
                                            
39 ["MM les citoyens de couleur demandait particulièrement d'être autorisé à excepter de 
cette amnistie ceux qu'ils savent s'être portés à des excès et de pouvoir les livres eux 
mêmes à la sévérité et a la vengeance des Loix."]  "Concordat entre les Citoyens de 
Couleur et Tousard, 23 Novembre 1791,"Ibid. 
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decrees of the Assembly and exhorted the townspeople to treat the gens de 
couleur "with a friendly heart filled with peace."40  Tousard had the citizens sign 
an act giving him the power to carry out the Concordat.  The act stated that the 
citizens agreed with Tousard's desire for an alliance and that they were giving 
him to power to carry it out.  Thus, Tousard justified the Concordat to the 
Assembly and to his superiors both by invoking the laws of the metropole as well 
by getting the local citizenry to authorize his actions.  In this way, Tousard 
empowered himself from both the bottom, the citizenry, and the top, the law, to 
be a power broker between the military and the gens de couleur. 
 It appears that Tousard was not the only white intermediary involved in 
these negotiations.  In order to facilitate communication, Tousard approached 
another intermediary -- a white man named Gérard trusted by the gens de 
couleur --to ask him to intercede on his behalf. The true nature of Gérard's 
relationship with Jean-Baptiste Marc and the other gens de couleur is unclear.  
He was apparently with the gens de couleur and acting as an intermediary 
between them and local white communities.  Tousard wrote to him on November 
22, "The citizens of color...have made me hope that you will come today and 
cement, by your opinion and the confidence they have in you, the perfect 
agreement and intimate union that I desire to establish between them and the 
white citizens."41  Gerard accompanied the deputies of the gens de couleur to the 
                                            
40 ["d'un coeur ami de la paix soit rempli..."] "Addresse de M. de Tousard Commandant 
de la Parti de l'Est à mesieurs les Citoyens de la ville et de la pleine qui s'y trouvent 
réunis,"Ibid., 23. 
41 [Les citoyens de couleur députes auprès de moi, Monsieur, m'avaient fait espérer, que 
vous viendriez aujourd’hui cimenté par votre avis et la confiance qu'ils ont en vous 
l'accord parfait et l'union intime que je désire établir entre les citoyens Blancs et eux.  Je 
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negotiations, carried letters back to Jean-Baptiste Marc, and was with the 
deputies when they signed the Concordat.  Tousard spoke of Gerard as an 
important part of the negotiations as a white colonist who was trusted by the 
gens de couleur.  His position as an interlocutor allowed him to foster dialogue 
and ultimately (for a time) an alliance.  Given the unwillingness to negotiate of the 
Colonial Assembly, the role of on-the-ground intermediaries was crucial to 
attempts to broker a peace settlement. 
 Despite the success of the negotiations, however, tensions between gens 
de couleur and white troops soon began to show, underscoring the tenuousness 
of the alliance and the discordance of the political goals of each group.  With the 
signing of the Concordat, Marc and his second, Cézar aligned themselves with 
Tousard, who generously supplied them with as much military armament as they 
requested.  Tousard was delighted.  He praised Cézar for having saved the 
district from the "brigands" and even offered to write the Assembly to recommend 
that he receive a reward.  However, Tousard quickly became angered at the bad 
conduct of the gens de couleurs, who he said were disorderly, leaving camp, 
taking supplies, and communicating with the insurgents without permission.  
Despite Tousard's assertions of well being, the actions of the rank and file belied 
the outward appearance of peace. 
 It is clear from the Concordat itself that not all members of the gens de 
couleur's forces wished to join the colonist's army.  Written into the Concordat 
                                                                                                                                  
vous prie donc Monsieur de vouloir bien vous rendre à mon camp et j'espère qu'il ne 
fera pas difficile dans les dispositions ou je les ai trouvés de terminer une affaire aussi 
avantageuse à cette dépendance.] "Tousard to de Blancheland, 24 Novembre 
1791,"Ibid., 15. 
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was an acknowledgement of this internal division.  The fifth paragraph of the 
document reads:  "Messieurs the deputies of the Citoyens de Couleur said for 
their part that their reunion [with Tousard] didn't not have any cause but the 
public good, because the complaint they make of the laws is something 
absolutely independent of the caprice of private individuals, of which the 
execution belongs particularly to the executive power which has the right of 
coercion."42  In the text, the deputies were acknowledging and separating 
themselves from the gens de couleur who were working against the alliance.  As 
Tousard professed his trust in Cézar and Marc and entreated them to help return 
ateliers to work, he also ordered that the gens de couleur have no 
communication with the insurgents, for fear that "would let themselves be 
persuaded easily."43  He ordered white troops to "establish a line to prevent the 
brigands from penetrating" colonial forces and attempting to reestablish relations 
with gens de couleur.44  Later that week, Tousard's list of grievances got even 
longer.  He issued an order that all Citoyens de Couleur à Ouinaminthe send all 
                                            
42 ["MM les Députés des Citoyens de Couleur on dit à leur tour que leur réunion n'avait 
eu pour cause que le bien public car la réclamation qu'ils font des lois est une chose 
absolument indépendant des caprice des particuliers dont l'exécution appartient 
particulièrement au pouvoir exécutif qui à le droit de cohéritons."]  "Concordat entre les 
Citoyens de Couleur et Tousard, 23 Novembre 1791,"Ibid., 26-29. 
 
43 ["se laisser persuader aisément..."] Tousard to de Blancheland, 1 Décembre 1791," 
Ibid., 40. 
 
44 [...établir une ligne qui [illeg.] empêcher les brigands de pénétrer."] "Tousard to M. 
Marc à Camp Ferrié, 1 Décembre 1791,"  Ibid., 41. 
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of the slaves they had taken for their own use back to their plantations.45  Despite 
these preventative measures, many gens de couleur apparently continued to 
break Tousard's orders, suggesting that his alliance was not as popular as he 
wished it to be. 
 Tousard's public calm, however, masked more serious disobedience on 
the part of the gens de couleur and the coercive actions of Tousard, as he tried 
to maintain a relationship that was, by all indications, breaking down.  Within ten 
days of the signing of the Concordat, Tousard's letters had become preoccupied 
with the escalation of opposition of many gens de couleur troops to serving under 
him.  In response to "acts of bad faith" and "disorder" of many gens de couleur, 
Tousard issued an address to the Messieurs des Citoyens de Couleur à 
Ouinaminthe on December 2nd.  "I am too convinced of the loyalty and frankness 
of the Citoyens de Couleur," he began, to believe that they would have named 
new deputies to him without his prior knowledge or consent.46  Rather than 
becoming angry, Tousard would use this as an opportunity to defend his actions 
and to demonstrate that the best way to win rights was to align with the Colonial 
Assembly, "from which the nation and the laws come."47  Tousard wrote to Cézar 
                                            
45 ["...il est ordonné aux Citoyens de Couleur réuni à Ouinaminthe [illeg.] de renvoyer sur 
leurs habitations respectives les nègres esclaves qu'ils ont prie pour montrer leurs 
gorges et faire autre services quelconque."] "Ordre, 29 Novembre 1791," Ibid., 37. 
 
46Tousard does not explain the significance of the new deputies, but it seems likely, in 
view of Tousard's other complaints, that he was wary of discontent gens de couleur 
coming up the ranks who would challenge the peace established by the Concordat. 
 
47 ["Je suis trop convaincu de la loyauté et de la franchise des Citoyens de Couleur pour 
croire qu'ils ayant bien réfléchi lorsqu'ils on nommé de nouveaux députés auprès de 
moi, je n'en suis cependant pas fâché puisque cela m'a donné occasion de leur 
expliquer ma conduite et de leur montrer que le meilleur moyen d'assurer leurs droits et 
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that Cézar's men "who had run away from my camp did so, my dear Cézar, 
without my orders and will severely punished, I assure you always and I ask you 
to believe," he wrote, "that I don't suffer any disorder and that I give... severe 
orders to arrest all of those who have run away from my camp."48  Whether or not 
Tousard's words were meant to be an entreaty to Cézar to help maintain order in 
his troops, or a warning to him that Tousard was fed up with his men's 
clandestine activities, Tousard's letter clearly demonstrates that the relationship 
between the gens de couleurs and himself were not nearly as harmonious as 
Tousard wished de Rouvray and de Blancheland to believe. 
 The precariousness of the alliance is further underscored by the fact that  
Tousard issued a Proclamation on the 4th of December addressing the gens de 
couleurs.  Tousard began by defensively insisting that the "conduct of the 
Citoyens de Couleur is inexplicable, I have done for them and for the white 
citizens who have confided in me the interests of the Dépendance de l'Est 
everything that my conscience and my love of good has told me to do."  Tousard 
blamed the problems of morale and disobedience on "a few instigators” who had 
"undertaken to mislead [les Citoyens de Couleur]."49  "Those of you who love 
                                                                                                                                  
leurs [illeg.] c'est [illeg.] en rapporte a la décision du l'assemblée générale a laquelle la 
nation et les lois viennent d'attribuer le pouvoir...."] "Address à MM des Citoyens de 
Couleur à Ouinaminte, 2 Décembre 1791," Ibid., 41. 
 
48 ["Les gens qui se sont écartés de mon Camp l'ont fait, mon Cher César, sans mes 
ordres et vont être punir sévèrement, je vous assure toujours et vous prie de croire que 
je ne souffre aucune désordre et que je donne en ce moment des ordres sévères pour 
arrêter tous ceux qui se seront écartés de mon Camp..."] "Tousard à Cézar, 2 Décembre 
1791," Ibid. 
 
49 ["La conduite des Citoyens de Couleur est inexplicable, j'ai fait pour eux et pour les 
citoyens blancs qui m'avaient confié les intérêts de toute cette dépendance tout ce que 
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disorder," he lamented, "continue to put obstacles in front of my efforts to 
reestablish order..."  Tousard warned the gens de couleur not to listen to "bad 
advice" and that his conduct would reflect their actions.  Tousard's proclamation 
was a mixture of good will and warnings, reflecting the tension and discordance 
between the white and free colored troops. 
 Though Tousard praised his alliance with the gens de couleur to de 
Blancheland and remained vague about infractions, it is clear that Tousard's 
control over Jean-Baptiste Marc and Cézar's men was tenuous at best, and that 
Tousard was forced to rely upon and trust these leaders.  The arrival of nearly 
4,000 insurgent troops to the vicinity for negotiations with the Colonial Assembly 
exacerbated these tensions and further eroded Tousard's control over the 
situation.  Tousard wrote to Cézar on 5 December that during one battle on a 
plantation, a group of slaves killed two of his white soldiers, and then "claimed 
that they had orders from [Cézar] to massacre all" white troops.50 Tousard's letter 
inexplicably ends there.  It is unclear whether or not Tousard believed the 
accusation or not.  However, two days latter Tousard wrote to de Blancheland 
that while serving under Jean François and Candy, Cézar and his second, Noël, 
had been tasked with raising all of the ateliers from the plantations to join the 
fighting, and that Tousard was now finding it very difficult to return the ateliers to 
their work.  Tousard complained that though Cézar's help in fighting the 
                                                                                                                                  
ma conscience et l'amour de la bien m'ont dite....j'ai la douleur de voir que quelques 
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insurgents was useful, many gens de couleur serving under him were "giving into 
their bad inclinations...” Jean François had arrived at l'Acul the previous Saturday 
with nearly 4,000 men. Though his letters to his superiors remained optimistic, 
Tousard's increasing concern and complaints about the "disorder" and "bad faith" 
of the gens de couleur suggests that despite the professed wishes and actions of 
Jean-Baptiste Marc and Cézar, a number of masses were colluding with 
insurgents. 
 Ultimately, the partnership proved untenable.  After three months Cézar 
and his troops deserted, hiding their three best canons in the cane fields, and 
joined the rebel forces at Dondon.  Within two days, he was attacking Marmelade 
with the insurgent forces.  Jean-Baptiste Marc replenished his store of munitions 
and did likewise, turning on the garrison and helping rebel forces take control of 
the district shortly thereafter. 51   Tousard's plan had failed and by the spring of 
1792, with hostilities resumed, Tousard lost much of his popular support and 
reputation.52  It is unclear whether Jean-Baptiste Marc and Cézar always 
intended to desert.  It is conceivable, especially in light of Tousard's accusations 
that gens de couleur were deserting camp and instructing slaves to attack white 
troops, that the entire event was a well-planned ruse.  
 It is likely, however, that many gens de couleur, in light of their exclusion 
from colonial society, were willing to join whichever side they felt would benefit 
them most.  The gens de couleur had plenty of reason to be disillusioned with the 
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colonial government, which continually ruled against and excluded them, but 
Tousard's words of friendship and amnesty may have seemed to promise 
political rights in exchange for military service.  However, despite the gens de 
couleur's key role in fighting against insurgents Cape Français and Tousard's 
alliance, in January 1792 the Colonial Assembly nullified all Concordats with 
gens de couleur and again declared that there would be no negotiations on the 
status of free people of color until after the conclusion of the war.53  By the spring 
of 1792, gens de couleur were also reportedly unhappy that the Decree of 
September 24th had revoked the political rights given to them in the 15th of May 
Decree.54  It is in the context of these setbacks, then, that Cézar, Jean-Baptiste 
Marc, and their forces decided to desert Tousard and fight for the insurgents. 
 Tousard's desire to negotiate an end to fighting quickly brought about a 
drastic change in his feelings towards the leaders of the insurgent army.  On 
November 27th, Tousard wrote to de Rouvray that he had received a letter to the 
Colonial Assembly from Jean François and Biassou.  Though Tousard "doubt[ed] 
that the General Assembly would accept the propositions of the brigands," he 
found their demands to be a reasonable and promising route to ending the war.  
Tousard summarized the letter, saying that it blamed "Jeannot [for] all crimes, 
and said that Jean François and Biassou, far from being culpable, deserved 
rewards..." The insurgent leaders made four demands in exchange for returning 
slaves to "their work:" 
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 1.  Freedom for all major officers... 
 2.  General amnesty for all nègres 
 3.  The ability of the leaders to retire to wherever they would like in a 
foreign country, if they decide to move there. 
 4.  ... Permitting if these conditions are accepted to return quickly the 
slaves to their work and to refer, with regards to their fate, to the 
commanders of the King, whose arrival cannot be far off. 55 
 
Tousard likewise wrote to Fort Dauphin that the address "offered to return all of 
the nègres to their work..."56  Tousard seemed to think that the freedom of a 
number of leaders was a small price to pay for returning slaves to plantations and 
peace to the colony. The fighting, he said, had changed his views, and quickly.  
"A foible that I have long had, the love of glory, I have no longer, I see that in 
these unhappy times one loses in a minute that which one has worked ones life 
to obtain."57  In three short weeks, Tousard had seen himself and his forces 
outnumbered nearly ten to one, his men fall sick and wounded, and nearly half 
his healthy forces be called away to protect the capital.  The properties around 
Fort Dauphin lay mostly in ruins, and colonists hunkered down in nearby towns 
for safety.  Perhaps these hard realities were what had disabused the once 
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arrogant officer of his notions of glory.  However, Tousard's change of heart was 
not shared in the colony and all negotiations soon failed.  Just as many of the 
rank and file among the gens de couleur were unwilling to compromise, so were 
both the planters in the Colonial Assembly and the masses of ex-slaves, as we 
will see. 
 Though Tousard's negotiations failed, they nonetheless represent the 
possibility of colonial whites accepting gens de couleur as political equals.  
However, his letters show that despite the actions of power brokers such as 
himself, Jean-Baptiste Marc, and Cézar, the actions of the rank and file made 
their opposition to negotiation and compromise clear.  Further, the Colonial 
Assembly continually refused to negotiate with gens de couleur or even address 
the issue of their rights. In response to the demands for political rights, colonists 
argued that granting gens de couleur equality with whites would undermine the 
institution of slavery.   For, if anyone whose parent had ever been a slave could 
become equal with whites, what justification remained for slavery itself?  Yet, in 
the face of the 1791 insurrection, Tousard and de Rouvray were willing to 
compromise on political rights for gens de couleur in order to save slavery.  
Neither they nor the Colonial Assembly, however, could abide curbing the 
absolute power of the master over his slave in order to regulate conditions on 
plantations.  It appeared, then, that the primary concern of many colonial whites 
such as Tousard and de Rouvray was not maintaining strict racial categories, but 
instead, of protecting the absolute authority of plantation owners over their slave 
laborers.
 III.  Jean François, Biassou and the Colonial Assembly 
 Jean François and Biassou, like Tousard, felt that the stalemate between 
the insurgents and the colonial forces provided the opportunity for negotiations.  
Like Tousard, Jean François and Biassou attempted to reach a compromise in 
order to end fighting.  However, like the gens de couleur forces, divisions 
between the rank and file of the insurgent army and insurgent leaders were 
apparent from the beginning of the Revolution.  The ranks of officers were almost 
all made of elite slaves, slave drivers or other skilled laborers, and free blacks 
and free people of color.  The rank and file of the insurgent forces, on the other 
hand, were predominantly field slaves or other unskilled slaves whose interests 
and aspirations did not necessarily conform to those of their leaders.  Almost 
from the beginning of the fighting, in September, insurgent leaders had 
expressed a desire to negotiate.58  This desire culminated in negotiations in 
November and December between Jean François and Biassou and the Colonial 
Assembly, in which the insurgent leaders would propose the amelioration of, and 
not the destruction of, the institution of slavery.  However, as with Tousard's 
alliance with the gens de couleur, Jean François and Biassou's negotiations 
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would ultimately fail due to the opposition of the rank and file of the insurgent 
army as well as that of the planters in the Colonial Assembly. 
 Like Tousard, Jean François and Biassou decided to use their positions of 
military leadership to undertake negotiations on behalf of the entire insurgency.  
The very same day that Tousard wrote to Jean François and Biassou, on 
November 17th, the insurgent leaders were holding a meeting discussing what 
demands they would make. Jean François had learned of the imminent arrival of 
the civil commissioners from France carrying legislation from the National 
Assembly and, he feared, troops to fight the insurgents. According to Gros, on 
November 17, Jean François summoned his council: "Here we are, [Jean 
François' counsel] said, at the end of November: the Forces, expected from 
France, cannot now be long before they arrive; and it will be much to our 
Advantage, to offer some Accommodation to the whites, to avert greater Evils; for 
it is to be feared, they will grind us even to dust."59  Jean François' counsel 
prudently decided to attempt to negotiate before the arrival of troops, and they 
drafted demands to present to the Colonial Assembly, which they send to 
Tousard, who was in turn to relay the letter to the General Assembly. 
 According to M. Gros, Jean François and the other insurgent leaders were 
not fighting to end the institution of slavery.  Gros described Jean François as 
being uncomfortable with his position of responsibility for the demands of the 
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slaves.  Gros held a high opinion of Jean François, differentiating him from the 
class of slaves who were fighting under him, an impression Jean François self-
consciously cultivated in his letters to colonial authorities.  "His reflections carried 
with them a degree of good sense," Gros lauded, "a fund of humanity, and a ray 
of genius, far superior to any sentiment that might have been expected from his 
kind."60   According to Gros, Jean François presented himself as a reluctant 
leader, telling Gros he “did not intend myself a General of the Negroes: Those, 
who had the Power of conferring the Title, have invested me with it.”  To Gros, 
Jean François was dismissive of emancipation as a goal of the insurrection.  “In 
taking up Arms,” he said, “I never pretended to fight for the General Liberty of the 
Country, which, I know, to be merely chimerical…”  Jean François continued that 
he understood the absolute “Need, France ha[d] of her Colonies, as [well as] by 
the Danger there would be in obtaining for this uncivilized Set of Beings, a Right, 
which, would be infinitely more dangerous to them, and which, would indubitably 
draw along with it, the Annihilation of the Colony...”61  It is important to note that 
Jean François was technically speaking to the enemy.  However, Gros was 
highly supportive of Jean François' efforts to negotiation and was serving as his 
secretary.  Even if Jean François was editing his statement because Gros was a 
white colonist (an attorney), or if Gros was mediating Jean François' actual 
words, the statement is still indicative of several things.  First, it is notable that 
Jean François did not present himself as a proponent of general emancipation or 
as a member of the mass of slaves, and second, that he thought the slaves who 
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were fighting under him could be made (possibly by force) to go back to 
plantations. 
 Jean François’ positioning of himself to Gros hints at tension that existed 
between himself and the gens de couleur officers on the one hand, and the slave 
insurgents on the other, tensions that would ultimately jettison negotiations.  It 
seems that these tensions were exacerbated by Jean François' desire to 
negotiate, which he attempted to keep a secret.  "It was requisite," wrote Gros, 
"that the Negroes who were naturally suspicious and bloody minded, should be 
kept in the Dark, respecting every Transaction tending to this Adjustment: Thus, 
they took every essential Precaution to obviate it's being known."62  Within both 
Jean François and Biassou's forces, there were a small number of black and 
gens de couleur officers controlling much larger numbers of black slaves.  For 
this reason, Jean François and Biassou had to temper their behavior in order to 
maintain their leadership.  According to Gros, "the People of Colour, possessed 
not the Power of protecting us from the Rage of the Negroes; but they, on the 
other Hand, were in universal Dread of them."63  It appears that the rank and file 
of the insurgent army was just as unwilling to compromise as the Colonial 
Assembly.  Former slaves were unwilling to give up the liberty they had fought 
hard to obtain, and planters were unwilling to compromise any power over their 
former slaves.  Thus, while Jean François and Biassou attempted to negotiate on 
behalf of the insurgents, the former slaves themselves were clearly unwilling to 
compromise the freedom they had won. 
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 The letter Jean François and Biassou wrote to the Colonial Assembly 
showed that rebel slaves had good reason to be suspicious of their officers.  
During the negotiations, Jean François was first concerned for his own freedom 
and the freedom of his officers.  Ameliorating the conditions for slaves was a 
secondary concern.  Nonetheless, the stated goal of the insurgent army, as 
defined by these leaders, was concrete changes in, and not the destruction of the 
institution of slavery.  In the beginning of December, before Jean François' camp 
learned of the arrival of the civil commissioners, he sent a letter to the Colonial 
Assembly through Tousard.  Though this letter has not survived in the archives, 
we know from Tousard's summary of its contents to de Rouvray that Jean 
François and Biassou were offering to bring slaves back to plantations in 
exchange for the freedom of officers.  Garran de Coulon, early historian of the 
Haitian Revolution, substantiates Tousard’s summary, writing "It appears that the 
nègres generals requested from it the freedom of the principal members of their 
officers and some laws to improve the fate of the slaves,” de Coulon wrote.64  As 
with Tousard's negotiations with the gens de couleur, the arrival of the civil 
commissioners with the 24th of September decree, changed the legal landscape 
of the negotiations.   The Decree of amnesty to all free persons for acts of 
revolution committed in the political furor of the French Revolution opened a door 
gens de couleur and slaves to try to gain concessions from the Colonial 
Assembly. 
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 The insurgent leaders attempted to exploit the amnesty of the 24th of 
September in order to force the Colonial Assembly to negotiate with them. Jean 
François and Biassou again wrote to the Colonial Assembly on the 4th of 
December, after he had learned of the arrival of the civil commissioners. Jean 
François and Biassou wrote that, in light of this new decree, they were sure that 
the Assembly would look favorably upon the demands they had presented in 
their previous letter.  "We must be included in the general amnesty pronounced 
for all indiscriminately," they wrote.65 Both Tousard and the Colonial Assembly 
rejected Jean François' claim that the proclamation of amnesty for acts of 
revolution of the 24th of September should apply to insurgents, yet Tousard did 
not hesitate to apply this same reasoning to the gens de couleur who joined his 
troops. 
 Jean François, like Tousard, argued that he was presenting the sole 
means of restoring slavery in the colony.  He wrote that he made these demands, 
"in the name of the colony in danger, to ask of you the lone and unique means of 
restoring promptly and without loss of order in such an important colony."  Of the 
demands they had made, however, Jean François was clear that "the first article 
is of absolute importance" (the first article being the freedom of himself and a 
number of his officers).66  These first two letters are telling.  Jean François 
                                            
65 Dubois, Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 125. 
 
66["Nous avons cru devoir, au nom de la colonie en danger, vous demander les seuls et 
uniques moyens de rétablir promptement et sans perte l'ordre dans une si importante 
colonie; vous avez dû peser la demande et les motifs qui l'ont dictée: le premier article 
reposé (*) est de convenance absolue."  "*Sans doute la liberté des principaux officiers 
nègres."]  Lettre de Jean François Biassou, ect. à l'assemblé coloniale, du 4 décembre 
1791Garran de Coulon, Rapport Sur Les Troubles De Saint-Domingue : Fait Au Nom De 
  38 
positioned himself as apart from, and condescending of, the slaves fighting for 
him.  Yet, in so doing, he was able to assert that the only way to restore order 
was to grant himself and his officers freedom and to ameliorate the conditions of 
slavery, specifically, by granting slaves three free days a week and abolishing the 
whip and the cachot.  Further, Jean François asserted that it was the unusual 
cruelty and barbarity that masters and overseers showed toward slaves that had 
driven them to revolt.  The logical conclusion of this statement was, of course, 
that if the Colonial Assembly ameliorated the conditions of slavery, the slaves 
would return to their labor.   
 Jean François and Biassou attempted to use the threat of the anger of the 
“uncivilized” horde of slaves following them to convince the Assembly to come to 
the table and take their entreaties seriously.  On 12 December, the insurgent 
leaders again wrote to the commissioners, this time stressing that the only way to 
restore order in the colony was to acquiesce to some of their demands.  To do 
this, Jean François and Biassou invoked the danger of slaves being controlled by 
neither the colonists nor their officers.  “We cannot hide from you that this 
undertaking [negotiating] has its dangers,” they wrote.  Slaves believed 
themselves entitled to certain concessions because “False rumors [have made] 
the slaves obstinate, for example, the idea that the king has granted them three 
days per week.”  As such, not granting the slaves their demands would be highly 
risky, the leaders cautioned, “[The slaves] will say they have been tricked, and 
the consequences can be deadly if we do not approach this operation with the 
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greatest caution.”  All of this, Jean François and Biassou asserted, meant that 
the Colonial Assembly’s best and indeed only course of action was “to grant 
liberty to all the commanders, leaving the choice to the generals because they 
know which of them have influence over the nègres either because of the fear 
they inspire in them or for other known reasons.”67  On the surface, it appears in 
this letter that Jean François and Biassou were forsaking their loyal followers and 
that their primary goal was their own freedom.  However, they were also offering 
a clever warning to the commissioners.  By claiming that the slaves believed 
themselves entitled to three days a week free and that they would continue to 
fight unless some concessions were made to them, the insurgent leaders were in 
fact bargaining for on the ground improvements in slaves' lives.68  Jean François' 
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tactic is similar to Jean-Baptiste Marc's use of his own troops doubts to elicit a 
Concordat from Tousard. 
 Jean François and Biassou also attempted to remove blame from 
themselves and their followers in their next letter by claiming that the actions of 
the masters themselves had driven their slaves to revolt.  On December 21 they 
again wrote to the Assembly, this time stressing the conditions on plantations. 
"Permit us to take the liberty to share with you our reflections on the statements 
made to us by the nègres slaves,” they began, “You must know that in our role as 
chiefs we have a great deal of power over them.... We have been able to unite 
most, if not all of them."69  They continued that the slaves wanted to make peace, 
but were afraid of two things.  First, they were afraid of being tortured and 
executed like those who had been involved in the Ogé affair.70  Second, they 
feared the vengeance of their masters, something they had good cause to fear.  
“The bad treatment of their masters,” they wrote, “most of whom torture their 
slaves by mistreating them in all sorts of ways, taking away their two hours [of 
midday rest], their holidays, and Sundays, leaving them naked, without any help 
even when they are sick, and letting them die of misery.” These deplorable 
conditions, the “many barbarous masters there are who enjoy being cruel to 
these miserable slaves,” they claimed, were both the cause and the solution of 
the crisis.  The solution was “Outlawing such harsh mistreatment, abolishing the 
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terrible plantation prisons [the cachots], where they stays are miserable, and 
trying to improve the condition of this class of men so necessary to the colony, 
and we dare assure you that they will take up their work once again and will 
return order.”71  In this letter, even more so than in earlier communications, Jean 
François and Biassou highlighted the atrocious conditions of slavery and the 
barbaric treatment of slaves by their masters as the real reason for the 
insurrection of the slaves.  By displacing blame from the slaves onto slave 
masters, Jean François and Biassou asserted that the rebellion was not about an 
end to slavery, but rather about changing certain untenable conditions of slave 
labor. 
 Moreover, the insurgent leaders’ invocation of masters’ cruelty came in the 
context of increasing attempts in the colony to take legal action against especially 
cruel masters.  Though successful action was rare, it was illegal to torture and kill 
slaves through excessive methods, and a few planters had been deported from 
the colony for doing so.  In 1788, a planter named Nicholas Le Jeune was 
investigated over claims that he had tortured two female slaves he had 
suspected of using poison against other slaves.  Fourteen slaves from his 
plantation brought a complaint against him in the local court, despite his threats 
to kill anyone who did so.  The local judges decided to investigate, and when 
they arrived at Le Jeune’s plantation they found the women, both of whom died 
soon afterward, in chains, with their legs burnt and decomposing.  The box that 
he claimed contained poison contained only tobacco and rat droppings.  Le 
Jeune and other colonists defended himself by claiming that any inhibition of his 
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total control over his chattel’s bodies would fundamentally destroy a master’s 
control over their slaves.  The judges, however, argued that such harsh treatment 
of slaves would only result in the outbreak of revolt, and must therefore be 
curbed.  The court ultimately bowed to pressure from colonists, and Le Jeune 
escaped punishment.72  However, the investigation and prosecution of Le Jeune 
demonstrated that local courts were willing to consider the interests of slaves and 
challenge masters’ control over their lives.73 
 The Colonial Assembly agreed with Le Jeune and viewed Jean François 
and Biassou's demands as a threat to their absolute power.  The republican 
French civil commissioners were open to negotiating a peace settlement with 
Jean François and Biassou, however, their power to do so was challenged by the 
planters in the Assembly.  The Colonial Assembly claimed jurisdiction on 
decisions pertaining to the slave insurgents (who were property) and refused to 
negotiate.  On the 16 December, the Colonial Assembly issued a reply to 
"Emissaries of the nègres in revolt," stating that the Assembly, "founded on the 
law and by the law, cannot correspond with the people armed against the law, 
against all the laws" and therefore would not negotiate.  The Assembly could only 
show mercy to repentant culprits who returned to work and could forgive those 
who had been forced to fight against their will.74  The Assembly claimed that, 
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because slaves were the property of their masters, only the masters of the slaves 
and not the civil commissioners could offer them freedom.75  The Assembly 
feared that agreeing to negotiate with, let alone freeing, gens de couleur and 
slaves who had taken up arms against whites would create "a perfect equality 
between them and the whites" and permanently undermine slavery.76  Thus, 
though Jean François and Biassou claimed to be offering the Colonial Assembly 
a way to get slaves back to work on plantations, the assembly was fervently 
opposed on principle to any agreement with the insurgent leaders.  This same 
logic was used to table any discussion of rights for free people of color.  While 
Tousard presented giving rights to the gens de couleur as a path for restoring 
slavery to the North Province, the Colonial Assembly viewed political rights as a 
greater threat to their authority. 
                                                                                                                                  
coupables repentants et rentrés dans leurs devoirs.  Elle ne demanderait pas mieux que 
d'être à même de reconnaître ceux qui ont été entraînés contre leur volonté. Elle sait 
toujours mesurer ses bontés et sa justice; retirez-vous"] Procès-verbaux de l'assemblée 
coloniale, du 16 décembre 1791, au matin. Garran de Coulon, Rapport Sur Les Troubles 
De Saint-Domingue : Fait Au Nom De La Commission Des Colonies, Des Comitées De 
Salut Public, De Législation Et De Marine, 2:313.  Gros, An Historick Recital, of the 
Different Occurrences in the Camps of Grande-Reviere, Dondon, Sainte-Suzanne, and 
Others, from the 26th of October, 1791, to the 24th of December, of the Same Year. By 
Mr. Gros, Attorney Syndie [Sic] of Valiere, Taken Prisoner by Johnny. , 62. 
 
75 According to M. Gros, upon hearing this response from the Assembly, Biassou issued 
orders to kill all white prisoners in the insurgent camp.  Toussaint L'Ouverture, who was 
then known as Toussaint of Bréda and was an aide-de-camp of Biassou's, stepped in 
and insisted that the prisoners must receive a court-martial and that their death would 
certainly end peace negotiations.  Biassou later pardoned them. This is the first mention 
of Toussaint.  Gros, An Historick Recital, of the Different Occurrences in the Camps of 
Grande-Reviere, Dondon, Sainte-Suzanne, and Others, from the 26th of October, 1791, 
to the 24th of December, of the Same Year. By Mr. Gros, Attorney Syndie [Sic] of 
Valiere, Taken Prisoner by Johnny. , 63.  Garran de Coulon, Rapport Sur Les Troubles 
De Saint-Domingue : Fait Au Nom De La Commission Des Colonies, Des Comitées De 
Salut Public, De Législation Et De Marine, 2:315. 
 
76 Dubois, Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 126. 
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 The Assembly's expressed their opposition to negotiated peace in a 
meeting with Jean François at the end of December.  A face-to-face meeting at 
Saint-Michèl had been arranged between the commissioners, emissaries of the 
Assembly, and Jean François in order to discuss the insurgents’ demands.  
Though the Assembly was opposed to negotiations, they wished to conduct a 
prisoner exchange.  Jean François and Biassou had great hopes of reaching an 
agreement at this meeting.  According to Gros, “...an universal Peace was to be 
expected. The Whole of the Banditti wished it..."77 Many white colonists 
accompanied the commissioners and representatives, including Bullet, who had 
been the owner of the slave Jeannot, whose cruelty against white colonists as an 
insurgent leader had resulted Jean François executing him.  At the meeting, 
Bullet, who apparently knew that Jean François had killed his slave, found 
himself unable to hide his disdain for the insurgent leader.  While Jean François 
was dismounting from his horse, Bullet grabbed the horse's bridle and struck it 
with a whip.  Jean François quickly retreated to his own lines and considered 
breaking off negotiations altogether.78  Bullet's attitude towards Jean François 
                                            
77 Gros, An Historick Recital, of the Different Occurrences in the Camps of Grande-
Reviere, Dondon, Sainte-Suzanne, and Others, from the 26th of October, 1791, to the 
24th of December, of the Same Year. By Mr. Gros, Attorney Syndie [Sic] of Valiere, 
Taken Prisoner by Johnny, 67. 
 
78 ["Outre ces députés à l'assemblée coloniale, plusieurs autres colons assistèrent aussi 
à la conférence.  L'un d'entre eux nommé Bullet, qui avait été le maître du cruel Jeannot, 
et qui par cela même n'auront pas dû oublier que c'était Jean François qui l'avait fait 
punir, osa saisir le cheval de ce dernier par la bride et le frapper du fouet lorsqu'il eu 
descendit.  Jean François se retira précipitamment vers les siens dans une juste 
indignation; et cette insulte qui pouvait bien n'être pas [illeg.], à en juger par les 
événements postérieurs, pensa rompre à jamais toutes les négociations."]  Garran de 
Coulon, Rapport Sur Les Troubles De Saint-Domingue : Fait Au Nom De La 
Commission Des Colonies, Des Comitées De Salut Public, De Législation Et De Marine, 
314. 
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was indicative of the larger animosity toward the insurgents of the planters in the 
Assembly with whom Jean François was trying to negotiate.  Despite the fact the 
Jean François was offering planters a way to save their property and restore 
slavery, assemblymen such as Bullet could not restrain their contempt for the 
self-emancipated slaves and consider a very pragmatic compromise. 
 The civil commissioners wished to negotiate, but were powerless in the 
face of the Assembly's jurisdiction over all internal matters in the colony.  They 
nonetheless attempted to repair the damage caused by Bullet's insult and 
begged Jean François to come back to the meeting, which he did.  Jean François 
repeated, in person, the demands that he had made in his letters to the 
commissioners, while declaring the submission of himself and his followers to the 
commissioners.  The commissioners negotiated a prisoner exchange, which 
included Jean François' wife, who had been condemned to death but kept alive 
for fear of the consequences of executing her.  Jean François released his white 
prisoners, including M. Gros.  Biassou opposed the exchange, fearing losing 
important leverage over the stubborn Colonial Assembly, but Jean François 
wanted to make every effort for peace and, moreover, to maintain the moral high 
ground by making sure his behavior was irreproachable.79  After the meeting, 
several white military officers including Tousard renewed attacks on the 
insurgents and on the January 12, 1792, the insurgent army renewed its 
offensive in the North. 
 Though the insurgent leaders presented their demands for the 
amelioration of plantation life as limited and pragmatic, their implications were 
                                            
79 Ibid., 2:315. 
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far-reaching.  As was perhaps clear to the planters in the Assembly, the abolition 
of coercive punishments would have drastically changed the institution of slavery 
itself.  By disallowing masters complete control over their slave's lives and 
bodies, the seemingly pragmatic demands made by the insurgents would 
fundamentally changed labor relationships on the plantation.  Jean François and 
Biassou were building upon the legal challenges against masters' authority made 
in the 1780s, and in the process creating an important precedent of making the 
politics or work central in Revolutionary goals.  Labor demands would remain 
central to the changing ideological landscape of the Revolution.  However, the 
narrative of M. Gros and the letters of Jean François and Biassou demonstrate 
that their followers had their own ideas about work, labor, and freedom, and were 
not willing to have their fate decided without their consent.80
                                            
80 For information of Jean François and Biassou subsequent careers in the Spanish 
Empire, see: Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, Blacks in the New World. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999. 
 IV.  Conclusion 
 Both sets of 1791 negotiations presented opportunities for compromise, 
either of which could have drastically changed the outcome of what became the 
Haitian Revolution.  What immediately emerges from these sources is that each 
side was willing to make pragmatic demands and concessions in order to end the 
fighting.  First, negotiations between Jean François and Biassou and the Colonial 
Assembly raised the possibility that insurgent leaders would have agreed to 
attempt to escort their followers back to plantations in exchange for concrete 
improvements in labor conditions.  The second, negotiations between the gens 
de couleur and Tousard, demonstrated that the former were willing to fight 
against insurgents in exchange for political rights.  However, both negotiations 
were wrought with internal tensions and dissention and ultimately proved 
untenable.  In the end, neither the planters nor the mass of slaves were willing to 
compromise, the negotiations failed, battle lines hardened, and fighting resumed. 
 Though the negotiations of late 1791 ultimately failed, they are important 
because they provide a window into the actions and aims of the insurgents, the 
white military forces, and the gens de couleur very early on in the war.  Insurgent 
leaders demanded amelioration of the conditions on plantations, including the 
abolition of coercive punishments, and the freedom of a number of leaders. The 
gens de couleur strove for political rights and an end to discrimination against 
them, and appeared willing to fight for whichever side would benefit them most. 
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The negotiations show that some colonial whites, such as military commanders 
Tousard and the Marquis de Rouvray, could imagine embracing gens de couleur 
as "brothers" and political equals.  Tousard, in particular, staked his reputation 
(which he subsequently lost) on a partnership with the gens de couleur, who 
joined and then abandoned him. Examining the limited nature of the early 
demands emphasizes the contingency and uncertainty inherent in the 
Revolution. 
 These pragmatic demands remained important throughout the Revolution.  
The demands made by insurgent groups throughout the early period of fighting, 
from 1791 to 1793, continued to center around concrete improvements in their 
everyday lives.  During the first two years of fighting, neither general 
emancipation nor independence were stated goals of the insurgent army.  
Rather, insurgent leaders in both the North and South provinces continually 
asked for only the freedom of a certain number of leaders and the amelioration of 
labor conditions for slaves, specifically, three days a week free, the abolition of 
the whip and the cachot. Toussaint L'Ouverture was the first black leader to 
demand universal emancipation when he made it a pre-condition of his returning 
from Spanish Santo Domingo to fight for the French in June 1793.  During the 
negotiations that took place in 1791 and 1792 between insurgent leaders and the 
Colonial Assembly and the civil commissioners, black leaders consistently 
demanded not general emancipation but instead liberty for themselves and the 
amelioration of labor conditions for slaves.  
  49 
 These demands continued even after general emancipation was declared 
in August 1793, as newly termed "cultivators" continued to negotiate and struggle 
with the commissioners over the labor conditions under which they would work.  
Furthermore, emancipation did not end unrest in Saint-Domingue. French civil 
commissioners Léger Félicité Sonthonax and Etienne Polverèl's drew up acts of 
emancipation that included coercive measures designed to ensure that former 
slaves returned to plantations and resumed laboring for the colony.  Those still 
on plantations were required to remain there and all agricultural and domestic 
workers were prohibited from leaving their employment without permission of the 
local town government. Much to the commissioners’ dismay, the newly 
designated "cultivators," rejected the commissioners' system of free labor, 
refusing to work under the same conditions as slavery, except for wages.  
Further, former slaves insisted upon more free days per week. The negotiations 
after emancipation demonstrate the ways in which emancipation itself could 
become a tool for white elites to regain control of the labor of rebellious slaves.  
 The continuity of demands for the amelioration of working conditions on 
plantations before and after formal emancipation suggests a de-centering of 
emancipation as a goal of the early insurgency, and instead highlights the 
centrality of local working conditions in the Haitian Revolution.  In this way, the 
limited, pragmatic demands for improvements in labor conditions on plantations 
made by insurgents in the fall of 1791 proved to be a harbinger of things to come, 
and the politics of work remained central in the Revolution and in post-
independence Haiti. 
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 Studying the discourse of labor that existed alongside the language of 
universal rights allows us to more fully understand the Haitian Revolution and the 
roots of the modern Haitian state.  It is my hope that by studying the goals, 
demands, and compromises made by each side, we may develop a fuller 
understanding of the aims and motivations of the people who chose to take up 
arms against all odds and fight. 
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